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AFTERWORD

A BRIEF ARGUMENT FOR GREATER
CONTROL OF LITIGATION DISCRETION
THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND PUBLIC

-

CHOICE CONTEXTS
WALTER

J.

KENDALL, III*

One of the most troublesome aspects of the late 20th century
United States is the cynical, if not hostile, attitude most people have
about politics and politicians.' At the same time, we as a people continue to be the most litigious of societies.2 One could conclude that
litigation and the courts are more trusted to do the right thing than
are legislatures. The main purpose of this conference was to expose
to public view the inner workings of the Attorney General's office
and its impact on the "pursuit of justice". The organizers raised
three questions: who is the client, how are priorities set, and what is
the place of politics in policy decisions? The answers were expected
to provide useful insights into the policy making process of the litigating arms of the national government.
These questions were inspired by a reading of Kelman's Making
Public Policy - A Hopeful View of American Government,3 and
Heymann's The Politics of Public Management,4 as well as the ex* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. B.A., 1962 Brooklyn College;
J.D., 1965 St. John's University School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the
essential role of Professor Seng and Barry Weisberg in putting the subject conference
together and for Professor Seng's insightful critique of the questions addressed in this
article.
1. Twenty-five years ago the University of Michigan Research Institute asked a
sample of the American electorate, "Would you say the government is pretty much
run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit
of all the people?" Less than a third of those answering said the government was run
by and for big interest. By the mid '80's that figure had almost doubled. Farber &
Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987).
2.

J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981).
S. KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY: A HOPEFUL VIEW OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 6-7 (1987).
4. P. HEYMANN, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT (1987).

3.
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perience of the author in practicing and litigating for and against
the government.
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Kelman sets up a "simple roadmap" of the policy process consisting of 5 stages. Each stage feeds back (and forth) on the others:
1. Policy ideas, which are the "raw material" for any action (govern-

mental or otherwise); 2. Political choice (which is characterized by
a) commitment of the authority of the government for or against
actions, b) collective decision-making, and c) fundamental disagreement about what is to be done);7 3. Production of a program to carry
out the policy; 4. Final government actions that are experienced at

the "street-level;" ' and 5. Real-world outcomes, including the inevitable unintended effects. 9
Kelman discusses how the policy-making process works and

how well it works. The two normative standards he applies, which
the organizers accept enthusiastically, are the ability of the policy
process to produce good public policy and the effects of the process
on promoting human dignity. Kelman argues that success requires
high levels of public spirit (as opposed to self-interested behavior)
and that sufficient quantities of public spirit are present, such that
the role of government is more admirable than not. 10
The focus in the Conference was the empirical question of how

the participants in the policy divisions of the Department of Justice
and the U.S. Attorney's offices make decisions about priorities as
lawyers and agents for an ill-defined client or principal in a political
5. As indicated above, Professor Michael Seng played a major role in formulating the idea for the Conference and this paper. He is an experienced litigator as well
as a constitutional scholar. See Seng, The Cairo Experience: Civil Rights Litigation
in a Racial Powder Keg, 61 OR. L. REV. 285 (1982).
6. S. KELMAN, supra note 3. See also R. WEAVER, IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES
(Midway reprint 1976).
7. S.KELMAN, supra note 3, at 6.
8. Book Note, 79 MICH. L. REV. 811 (1981) (reviewing M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL
BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980).
9. GAYLIN, GLASSER. MARCUS & ROTHMAN, DOING GOOD-THE LIMITS OF BENEVOLENCE (1978).

10. S. Kelman, supra note 3, at 10. Another commentator has posed this
explanation:
Another point that America demonstrates is that virtue is not, as has been
claimed for so long, the only thing that can maintain a republic. Enlightenment, more than anything else, makes the social state possible. The Americans
are no more virtuous than other people, but they are infinitely more enlightened than any other people I know.
The mass of people who understand public affairs, who are acquainted
with laws and precedents, who have a sense for the interests, will understand
of the nation, and the faculty to understand them is greater here than in any
other place in the world
A. JARDIN, TOCQUEVILLE: A BIOGRAPHY 162 (2d ed. 1989).
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setting. We did not focus directly on institutional or structural questions, but they clearly have a significant effect on policy.11 Kelman
argues correctly that choices about institutional design matter "a
great deal."' 2 The structure either advantages or disadvantages participants by determining who decides and how they decide. Kelman
accepts the general anarchy of today's jurisprudence and political
theory and defines "good" public policy, not in substantive terms,
but as the result of proper process.13 Proper process requires first
that people try to achieve "good" public policy, i.e. that they be
public spirited. Second, it requires that there be "controls" to keep
final governmental action in at least a form that resembles earlier
political choices.
The query of whether the process itself builds our dignity and
character, Kelman's other criteria, seeks opportunity for meaningful
participation by those formulating, implementing, and being affected by the policy. Structure also influences the degree of otherregardedness present and thereby what is decided.
We did not consciously focus directly on an other major variable, the participant. Participants tend to see only one face of an issue and generally have various power resources available or different
strategies for getting things done. Thus, the process of formulating
and implementing policy is a very complex dynamic that can only be
studied synchronically, knowing full well that it operates diachronically. Study is further complicated by a sense that the Heisenberg
effect 14 is perhaps of greatest impact in the social sciences.
Heymann, who coincidentally was a division chief in the Department of Justice, tried to get beyond these two limitations by
studying "scores" of cases, 5 focusing primarily on sixteen cases of
political and managerial actions of government officials compiled by
the Kennedy School of Government. Heymann was looking for principals or criteria to guide a governmental unit towards "effective
performance," defined as maintaining legislative and public support
for the agency and the goals of its leader.1"
In a sense, Heymann answers the three questions we raised for
11. The Federalist Papers, Nos. 10-51; H. DESOTO, THE OTHER PATH (Paperback ed. 1989).
12. S. KELMAN, supra note 7, at 16.
13. Id. at 208.
14. The Heisenberg uncertainty or indeterminacy principle was first set forth
by Werner Heisenberg, a German physicist, in 1927. Its substance is that "any attempt to measure precisely the velocity of a subatomic particle, such as an electron,
will knock it about in an unpredictable way, so that a simultaneous measurement of
its position has no validity." THE NEw ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 125 (15th ed.
1988).
15. P. HEYMANN, supra note 4, at xiii.
16. Id.
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the attorney general. The client is the President, all decisions are
political (as defined by Kelman), and the priorities are those of the
leader. In another sense the answers aren't clear. For the Department of Justice, the client is the Attorney General, but his client is
the President; priorities include the laws passed by Congress which
must be "faithfully executed;" and organizational needs, which must
conflict at times with the priorities of the "temporary" leaders.
As a framework for both analysis and guidance, Heymann proposes a series of six questions to be asked over and over again, because "times will change and demand changes."' 7 In our opinion,
these questions are all focused on political choice, stage two of Kelman, and are most helpful when so viewed:
The first question is related to goals: how are goals initially chosen; what is monitored, and how does one recognize the need for
change?
The second question is about hierarchal relationships: what
does a manager owe to his or her superiors, and how much independent judgment should managers exercise?
The third question concerns internal matters: what is the special identity and role of the organization?
The fourth question is about vertical relationships: what other
entities are working on the same or related matters?
The fifth question is how does one deal with inevitable controversy: (The answer to this question requires particular sensitivity to
legitimacy of process and substance, their reality and appearances,
and the status of other related or affected players.)
The final question is-how does one keep sub-units from getting themselves into trouble, so that this reflects adversely on their
superiors? The answer to this question requires intense questioning
about organizational vulnerabilities.
According to Heymann, most of the activities of a large multifunctional agency like the Department of Justice will not change,
despite changes in presidents and attorney generals. The legal structures that create and limit an agency in large measure remain in
place; institutional values and shared functions provide the glue that
keeps a large entity together. Yet the President relies on each department to express his campaign themes concretely. Thus, choices
are made that dramatically change at least a few of the activities of
each Department.1 8
The model or metaphor Heymann suggested is that of "a
17.
18.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 56.
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loosely structural conglomerate corporation-a collection of goods
and activities (Departmental personal, Presidential, and constitutional) related to each other only in the administrative convenience
or the pattern of political opportunities provided on joint handling." 19 In one sense, a comparison of the Department of Justice
from the Carter years to the Reagan years would have as its "most
striking fact. . . how much continuity there was.""0 Despite the apparent differences, "the changes in the Department of Justice under
Attorneys General Smith and Meese represented a mere shift in the
sources of congressional and constituency support and a change in
the pattern of benefits provided and symbols embraced." 1 To Heymann service to the law ("scrupulous fairness, equality, and concern
about the neutrality and regularity with which governmental powers
are exercised 2 2) and service to the President (as embodiment of the
legitimate political interests of a democratic society), are common
duties acknowledged to be in a dynamic tension.
While apparently not Heymann's view,23 it can be argued from
Heymann's contrasts between Attorney General Bell and Attorney
Generals Smith and Meese, that each opted for the opposite pole
and both failed to respect the legitimacy of the other duty. Bell
talked of "an independent Department of Justice, or neutral zone in
the government, where decisions will be made on the merits free of
political interference or influence."2" On the other end of the spectrum Smith and Meese "determined to set the department on the
path of advocacy of the president's policy views even when these
were opposed to the firmly-arrived-at decisions of the courts [and
25
Congress].
Neither can succeed and both are inconsistent with the traditional more balanced role of the Attorney General and the Department. Why can't they succeed?
The answer is because of the permanence of the institutions and
interests that structure our pluralism. Authority, persuasive bargaining, centrality, reciprocity, and loyalty are the basic forms of influence in any society, 26 Especially in our heterogeneous electoral
system, despite any broad hegemony, each of these forms operates
19. Id. at 61.
20. Id. at 57.
21. Id. at 61.
22. Id. at 63.
23. "An overriding and single-minded dedication to the job of advocate for the
president where his views or interest are implicated, without pretence of a competing
responsibility to the courts and to the law as they have interpretedit, is a defensible
role of the Department." Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
24.

Id. at 63 (quoting G.

25. Id. at 65.
26. Id. at 148-56.

BELL

& R.

OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW

(1982)).
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subject to many pressures and constraints. Even an entity having
substantial authority and a central role in many decisions, like the
Justice Department has, cannot forgo any forms of influence without
losing it, influence that is.
While the influence of friends and foes can be changed over
time, and often rapidly, 27 changing interests, perceptions and beliefs
is more difficult. 2s Since these considerations are the major tools for
''reshaping the political environment," such reshaping is a long-term
phenomenon. Because of "human nature" and nature itself, it is
probable that such reshaping is beyond the control of "temporary"
public officials.
POLITICS

All this may seem a bit abstract but it is the theoretical context
within which the normative aspects of the conference must be evaluated. What about the empirical aspects? Heymann's questions are
focused on what Kelman calls "political choice," that is collective
decision-making about commiting the coercive authority of the
state, when there is fundamental disagreement about what is to be
done. Just how political is government litigation and how political
should it be? The toughest question is: is there any place for partisan politics in the exercise of prosecutional discretion? Asking the
question seems to elicit an almost pavlovian negative as a response.
This is a government of laws, not people; law is autonomous; law is a
science; there is a gulf between law and politics. One of the participants at the conference discussion on the role of the United States
Attorneys said, "the United States Attorney's Office, the Department of Justice at every level,. . . even at the level of the Attorney
General, should be. . . absolutely apolitical."29
On the other hand, another participant said, "politics, in a way,
is what makes democracy function: And. . . it's (not) realistic to
think that people do not come to political office through some political activity of some kind. . . And I think (the President has) a
right. . . to pick [U.S. Attorneys] who are good, competent attor27. Id. at 166-74.
28. Id. at 174-83.
29. Attorney General Symposium at 46 (Valukas) (transcript available at the
John Marshall Law Review Office) (hereinafter Symposium). The participants in the
symposium included: Justice Harlington Wood, Jr., of the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; the Honorable Anton R. Valukas, former
United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois; the Honorable John
Sietanka, United States Attorney for the Western District of Michigan; Barbara A.
Babcock, Ernest W. McFarland Professor of Law, Stanford University; Roger C.
Cramton, Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; and Wallace H.
Johnson, partner at the law firm of Kutak, Rock & Campbell, Omaha, Neb.
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neys, but who agree with his program that he has been elected on."13 0
This is a good thing because "some of our greatest blunders as a
society, governmental, have been by pulling people in and having
them make decisions theoretically ('we are not going to make them
politically'). They produce terrible tragedies in terms of policy and
in terms of personal suffering."3 1
The articles and discussion of the former Division chiefs particularly illustrate the tensions between the two views of politics. We
think it can be fairly said that reasonable people can draw the lines
in different places. 2
Even in the more mundane world of state and local government,
drawing the line is a sensitive and troublesome challenge. The following description of the early experience of the reformer and (future Mayor) Fiorello LaGuardia, as an assistant Attorney General in
New York State, illustrates this succintly:
One of his cases dealt with the noxious fumes that regularly
wafted over the Hudson from New Jersey factories. For years neighborhood associations had collected evidence and pressured officials to
restrict the emission of foul pollutants.
Finally, unable to ignore the issue, the attorney general undertook prosecution. Even LaGuardia was surprised that someone as inexperienced as he should be assigned to so complex a case. Technical
evidence had to be studied, the legal questions were knotty, and the
implications for relations between the states and the influential industries involved all had to be sifted and weighed. Nonetheless, only
eight weeks after his appointment on January 1, 1915, Fiorello was in
Washington filing complaints against seven offending factories in the
U.S. Supreme Court.
Despite his quick work, his superiors appeared less than delighted, and Fiorello thought he understood why. 'The party big shots
were closely connected with this matter,' La Guardia wrote. 'The corporations had used their tremendous influence and I was given orders
to take no action from now on,' unless instructed by the attorney general. Other explanations for the squelching are possible. After all, the
two states should have been able to negotiate a settlement out of
court, but Fiorello immediately suspected that the 'big interests' had
reached into the attorney general's office to protect their dangerous
practices.
La Guardia also moved to enforce state conservation laws prohibiting the harvest of young scallops from the oceans and beaches, but
despite strong evidence he lost several of these cases. Long Island juries just refused to deliver a guilty finding. Fiorello learned that the
local population resented the fact that this law was strictly used
against the small fishermen, while the commercial fisheries always
seemed to fill their quotas. La Guardia agreed that this was wrong and
30. Id. at 49 (Wood).
31. Id. at 45 (Smietanka).
32. Id. at 11-12 (Babcock).
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directed his staff to prosecute the larger offenders first. As the case
was being prepared, however, the state legislature added an amendment to the law permitting scallop fishing on private beaches. The
wealthier fisheries could afford to purchase these rights, while the
smaller concerns were forced to continue breaking the law in order to
compete. Disapproving of this inequity, La Guardia ordered his staff
to drop any further prosecutions under this law.
Another occasion brought him into court opposite 'my neighbor
in Greenwich Village, State Senator James J. Walker,' in a case where
the technical wording of a state consumer protection law was the central point of contention. Walker asked to address the court, advising
that as author of the law under discussion he could testify that it was
never intended for the particular situation before the court. The
judge, whom La Guardia remembered as 'an affable Tammany
Judge,. . . went out of his way to be nice to Jimmy,' and summarily
dismissed the case. After the trial the judge, Walker, and La Guardia
all went off for a drink. Fiorello, still upset by the verdict, pressed
Walker, asking how he could defeat his own law. And LaGuardia recalled that Jimmy, in his urbane way, said: 'Fiorello, when are you
going to get wise? Why do you suppose we introduce bills? We introduce them sometimes just to kill them. Other times we even have to
pass a bill in the Attorney General's office? You're not going to stay
there all your life. You make your connections now, and later on you
can pick up a lot of dough defending cases you are now prosecuting.
What are you in politics for, for love?'
In many states the chief government lawyers are elected. 4 How
can elected officials be anything but political? But does that mean
there is more or less prosecutional discretion in the elected position?
The participants in this symposium had conflicting views, but it is
clear that both elected and appointed government litigators are subject to partisan pressures.35
PUBLIC CHOICE
Contemporary interest group and public choice research demonstrates that legislators are influenced by special interests and are
faced with the possibility of incoherence. 6 In public choice terms,
the special interests are "rent-seeking" coalitions. Rent-seeking has
been defined as:
the attempt to obtain

. . .

payments for the use of an economic asset

in excess of the market price through government intervention in the
33.

KESSNER, FIORELLO LAGUARDIA AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN NEW YORK

36-37 (1989). This book is recommended reading for those who doubt that idealism is
possible in an electoral entext. See also Mikva, Symposium on the Theory of Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988).
34. See, e.g., Illinois, where the Attorney General of the state and the States
Attorney of each county are elected.
35. Symposium, supra note 29, at 50 (Valukas U.S. Attorney freer), and at 52
(Smietanka States attorney freer).
36. See generally I. MCLEAN, PUBLIC CHOICE (1987).
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market. A classic example of rent-seeking is industry's attempt to obtain monopolies

created by government (licensing or regulators

monopolies allow firms to raise prices above competischemes). Such
37
tive levels.
The incoherence allegation follows, again in public choice terms,
from Arrow's Impossibility Theorem."' The question is asked, "does
any voting system get us reliably from the preference ordering of
each citizen to the preference ordering of a nation?," and is answered by Arrow, "No." Arrow argued that if there are at least three
options and a finite number of voters, there is no voting system
which satisfies three fundamental conditions which are essential to
fairness and legitimacy. The conditions are: 1. that the voting
method deal with every individual preference ordering, 2. that if
every individual prefers x to y, then the social ordering also prefers
x to y, and 3. that only pairs of voters be compared to each step and
that there be no dictator.
In applications we get this: assume that three voters, Able,
Baker, and Charlie, must decide on which program to cut to balance
the budget-welfare, weapons, or women's programs. Their respective orders of preference are: Able-weapons, welfare, and women,
Baker-welfare, women, and weapons; and Charlie-women, weapons, and welfare. If pair voting is required, the majority cannot settle on a program. Able and Charlie will vote to cut weapons rather
than welfare; Able and Baker will vote for cuts in welfare rather
than women's programs; and Baker and Charlie will vote for cuts in
women's programs rather than weapons.
Obviously reality is much more complex on both aspects. A recent major study of interest group politics by Kay Lehman
Schlozman and John T. Tierney has reviewed the work of some of
the more sophisticated theories about interest groups. 9 Their study,
suggests that the key to understanding and predicting the role and
influence of interest groups depends on the distribution of costs and
benefits of the proposed policy. This study based on consideration of
almost 10,000 organizations active in politics, has been summarized
on this point in an extended footnote in these terms:
When both the costs and benefits of legislation are widely distributed in society, interest groups ordinarily would be expected to play a
subordinate role to ideological and partisan considerations. Medicare
37. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 n.6 (1986).
38. McLean, supra note 36, at 165-168.
39. The theorists reviewed include Lowi, American Business, Public Policy,
Case-Studies, and Political Theory, 16 World Pol. 677 (1964); M. HAYES, LOBBYIST
AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL MARKETS (1981); J. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATION (1973); and See generally SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986).
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is an example of such legislation. When both costs and benefits are
narrowly concentrated-for example, a subsidy to sugar beet farmers
that imposes higher production costs on candy makers-the group
conflict will be intense, and the general public is likely to remain
uninvolved. When benefits are concentrated and costs are distributed-for example, veterans' benefits-the group that would receive
the benefits will be active, but the general public has little incentive to
organize in opposition. Finally, when the benefits are distributed but
costs are concentrated-for example, environmental regulation-one
would expect the group on which the costs are to fall to be quite politically active and the general public, again, to have difficulty in organizing support for the measure.4"

The issue of incoherence or fundamental rationality is or should
be of greater concern in dealing with decisions of appointed officials
rather than elected officials. 4' This seems especially true when there
is a tradition of independence from partisan electoral policy choices
in the office being considered," and a fortiori when the position involves wide discretion and enormous power.4 s
In the discussion of the role of the U.S. Attorney's office and
the pursuit, of justice, all the participants frankly acknowledged
that, absent a matter of conscience requiring resignation," ultimately the governmental lawyer was the final arbiter of
prosecutorial discretion.4 At the same time, each also acknowledged
that there was a need (duty) to make the resources of the office
available to those protected by federal laws. 6
40. Faber & Fricker, The Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REv. 873,
886, n.72 (1987). This article is a valuable summary of the literature.
4t. "We do not view as equivalent the presumption of constitutionality afforded
legislation drafted by Congress and the presumption of regularity afforded an agency
in fulfilling its statutory mandate." Motor Vehicle Mftrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. 29, n.9
(1983).
42. In Branti v. Frankel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) the Court prohibited a newly selected Public Defender from firing assistant public defenders from the other political
party. The Court asserted that because any policy-making pertains to individual clients and not partisan political interests, and because access to confidential information was client specific and not relevant to party considerations, "it would undermine
rather than promote the effective performance of an assistant public defenders office
to make his tenure dependent on his allegiance to the dominant political party." Id.
at 519-20.
43. In U.S. v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984), the Court held that nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel does not apply against the government. In so doing the
Court explicitly recognized that "policy choices are made by one administration, and
often reevaluated by another." The Court frankly admitted
It would be idle to pretend that the conduct of Government litigation in all its
myriad features, from the decision to file a complaint in the United States
District Court to the decision to petition for certiorari to review a judgment of
the court of appeals, is a wholly mechanical procedure which involves no policy
choices whatever.
Id. at 161.
44. Symposium, supra note 29, at 6 (Wood), and at 16 (Crampton).
45. Id. at 3 (Valukas); at 26 (Johnson).
46. Id. at 32-3 (Wood).
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Further, other public choice or law and economics research
makes a compelling case that there are too few incentives for either
private or "public interest" lawsuits.47 In a recent study of attorney
fee shifting statutes the author states that if such theoretical analysis is sound, "it should be clear that prospective supply of civil
rights enforcement by the federal government is bound to be suboptimal."4 Citing substantial empirical and opinion data, the same author concludes that "The performance of the Enforcement Division
of the Justice Department and the Legal Services Corporation, two
governmental organizations deeply involved in civil rights enforcement, reenforces this prediction." 9
SETTING PRIORITIES

One of the speakers, when asked how one chooses between a
major narcotics case, an adulterated food case, and, hypothetically
the United States Attorney's favorite, a securities case, when all the
assistants are stretched to their limits, said, "that is probably the
single most difficult thing that a U.S. Attorney has to do."50
All of the participants struggled with this question. Some matters are so big, because of publicity, that they have to be handled. 1
Relationships with other entities of government obviously require
that certain cases be given priority. The influence of the FBI on the
priorities of the U.S. Attorney's office was acknowledged to be
significant. 2

Some of the priorities are set by the Attorney General. One of
the participants illustrated the complexity of the relationships between D.C. and the field and the role of political or electoral priorities in exercising litigation discretion.
An Attorney General, it seems to me, just like the United States
Attorney, may come in with an agenda in terms what he or she perceives to be important in law enforcement. Attorney General Meese
felt pornography prosecutions were a very significant matter and
should be of great concern. Not all the United States Attorneys would
have necessarily set that high on their priorities, and I think there was
a practical response to that. I think that the Attorney General set up
a task force which was to deal with nationwide pornography prosecutions. In my district, while I prosecuted some organized crime related
47. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 669 (1986).
48. Mureiko, A Public Goods Approach to Calculating Reasonable Fees Under
Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 438, 458 (1989).
49. Id.
50. Symposium, supra note 29, at 21 (Valukas).
51. Id. at 28 (Valukas) (Savings and Loan matters).
52. Id.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 23:215

pornography cases which dealt with child porn, it was not a major
priority. But if the Attorney General said this was an area in which we
should at least look for cases which we felt were worthy of prosecution, obviously, you are going to pay attention to it.83
Yet there was an insistence that the Washington people never
54
dictated priorities.
One of the speakers stated, "access is the key to power." 5 Does
the ordinary citizen have access, and therefore a direct influence on
priorities? Again one story can be used to illustrate the shared view
'of the participants that "nobody comes into our office and leaves
unsatisfied in this sense. . . [w]hen you have a problem that no one
else will solve, we are not going to pass you on:""6
I have made it a policy of going into the community and speaking
to groups about areas in which they have concern. A group of people
came in complaining about panic peddling in their neighborhood.
Realtors typically would panic peddle by going into old ethnic neighborhoods and say: Do you know who is moving in next door? And
then the houses would be sold for one tenth of what they were worth.
We went out and spoke to a number of community groups. And a
number of community groups went to see the United States Attorney.
I didn't know whether there were going to be prosecuted or what
these cases were really about. It ultimately ended up that there was
wholesale bribery of HUD inspectors who were falsifying mortgage reports, et cetera, to help fund this whole operation. Those prosecutions, led to not only the prosecution of HUD, but all of the suburban
corruption probes which took place in the early '70s in the Northern
District of Illinois.
We indicted and convicted over 150 public officials - as a result
of those HUD complaints which started with the complaints by the
citizens whose houses were being turned over in a panic peddle."1
These stories show the positive side of litigation discretion. Obviously that is not the only side. Questions about underenforcement
of civil rights matters, or overuse of RICO, are frequent in the press.
Again there is difficulty in drawing the line. However, one fixed star
exists and that is the constitutional requirement and oath of public
8
officials to see that the laws be faithfully executed.

53. Id. at 21-2.
54. Id.at 25-26 (Wood).
55. Id. at 9 (Johnson).
56. Id. at 36 (Smietanka).
57. Id. at 34-5 (Valukas).
58. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); Biden, Balancing Law and
Politics: Senate Oversight of the Attorney General Office, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
151, 159-60 (1990).

1990]

Public Interest and Public Choice
CONCLUSIONS

In our opinion, there should be 9 a three part check on Justice
Department activities similar to that used in review of legislative 0
or administrative agency action."1 It should create "rights" preventing or requiring exercise of litigation discretion; 2 it should protect
those who are disadvantaged in the political realm;63 and it should
6
encourage deliberation in the policy-making process. 1
In our view Heymann has adopted sub silentio the public choice
views of Mancur Olson 6 and others. He does, however, struggle to
find "good" in public policy formulation and implementation, 6 unlike others who see only "decline" from continued governmental involvement in the market1 7 We believe, with Kelman,6 s that there is
an effective residue of public spiritedness in public policy formulation and implementation. This Aristotilean or public interest view of
human nature contrasts with the Hobbesian or private interest view
underlying the public choice or economic model referred to above.
Obviously sorting out such a contrast and persuading anyone of
which view is correct would turn this afterword into a forward for a
new book on political theory. Thus we stop. 9
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(which describes Adams as "a situation where it could justifiably be found that the
agency has consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.").
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